I. INTRODUCTION
In United States v. Marcum, l the latest judicial interpretation of the military's sodomy statute,2 the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces 3 created a delicate balance between seIVicemembers' privacy rights and Congress's right to regulate the military.4 While limiting the Supreme Court's privacy protections articulated in Lawrence v. Texas 5 in the military context, the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces crafted a new rule in which military members are now required to apply a multi-part test to determine if their conduct is protected. 6 The resulting environment is one in which seIVicemembers may not be precisely sure whether their private, consensual, sexual conduct is proscribed. 7 Upon closer examination, however, one need only look to the legitimacy of the underlying relationship-in the eyes of the military-to determine whether the sexual conduct will be criminal and prosecutable. (a) Any person subject to this chapter who engages in unnatural carnal copulation with another person of the same 1. 60 MJ. 198 (CAA.F. 2004 ). 2. See 10 U.S.C. § 925, art. 125 (2000 239 [Vol. 35 or opposite sex or with an animal is guilty of sodomy. Penetration, however slight, is sufficient to complete the offense.
(b) Any person found guilty of sodomy shall be punished as a court-martial may direct. 9 The Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces' recent holding in United States v. Marcum has changed the scope, meaning, and understanding of Article 125 by creating a multi-part test to analyze sodomy cases. IO In creating the test, the court has followed the less than clear guidance of the Supreme Court's Lawrence decision and created a constitutional, albeit cumbersome, standard for those in the military. I I This comment will analyze the scope of the constitutional right to privacy as it is applied in the military context and explore the limits of the military's sodomy statute in light of the new test (hereinafter called the "Marcum Test") .12 This comment will first address the history of sodomy statutes. Then, it will parse the Supreme Court's holding in Lawrence v. Texas, the liberty right it created, and how the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces' recent holding in United States v. Marcum interprets that right in a military setting. Next, this comment will evaluate the constitutionality of the Marcum Test in the military and how the Marcum decision applies to military personnel today. Finally, this comment will suggest alternatives to criminally charging servicemembers for engaging in consensual sodomy.
II. HISTORICAL REVIEW OF SODOMY STATUTES

A. Origins of Statutes Proscribing Sodomy
The origin of sodomy laws in society stems from biblical interpretations of Genesis 19:4-11 from the Old Testament. I3 Based on the story 9. 10 U.S. C. § 925, art. 125 (2000) . 10 . Marcum, 60 MJ. at 205.
See infra Part V.C.
12. See infra Part IV.D. . The biblical verse is: But before they lay down, the men of the city, the men of Sodom, both young and old, all the people to the last man, surrounded the house; 5. and they called to Lot, "Where are the men who came to you tonight? Bring them out to us, that we may know them." 6. Lot went out of the door to the men, shut the door after him, 7. and said, "I beg you, my brothers, do not act so wickedly. 8. Behold, I have two daughters who have not known man; let me bring them out to you, and do to them as you please; only do nothing to these men, for they have come under the shelter of my roof." 9. But they said, "Stand back!" And they said, "This fellow came to sojourn, and he would play the judge! Now we will deal worse with of Sodom and Gomorrah, early Church teachings focused on God's vengeance upon the two cities for wide-spread homosexual activities.
JOHN J. McNEILL, THE CHURCH AND THE HOMOSEXUAL 42-43 (Beacon Press
14 It was also taught that these" 'offenses against nature'" were the cause of a number of natural disasters and other catastrophes. 15 Additionally, church leaders argued that God had given humans the ability to engage in sexual relations for the sole purpose of procreation. 16 To protect themselves from these curses and to promote procreativity, societies, through both civil and Church law, outlawed sodomy.17 The crime was often described as, "that detestable and abominable crime (among Christians not to be named) .... "18 This view of sodomy carried into England 19 and eventually flowed to America. 20 you than with them." Then they pressed hard against the man Lot, and drew near to break the door. 10. But the men put forth their hands and brought Lot into the house to them, and shut the door. 11. And they struck with blindness the men who were at the door of the house, both small and great, so that they wearied themselves groping for the door. Before Henry VIII's Reformation Acts criminalized sodomy in 1533, sodomy had only been considered a sin against the church. 21 Mter 1533, however, sodomy, or "buggery" as it was often called, could, for the first time, be punished in civil courts. 22
This new crime was a felony and its offenders faced death and, interestingly, loss of property.23 There was no exception for clergy who were usually only subjected to punishment by the church.24 This is important because it demonstrates, for the first time, a shift in power from the church to the state and exposes possible ulterior motives of the Reformation Parliament and Henry VIII.25
B. Sodomy Statutes Cross the Atlantic
As early as 1641, throughout colonial America, sodomy was a crime that was punishable by death. 26 The Massachusetts Bay code of 1641 made "man lying with man as with a woman" punishable by death.2' Even heterosexual sodomy was condemned. 28 The New Haven Law of 1656 "provided death for male-female anal intercourse, incitement to masturbation, and undefined acts of women 'against nature.' "29 In the agrarian colonies, procreation was not just God's will, it was viewed as a form of surviva1. 30 Therefore, the consequences of nonreproductive sexual acts were seen as an economic threat to society.31 21 Bowers, . GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-2(a) (1984) Though not mentioned in these articles, all disorders and neglects to the prejudice of good order and military discipline, all conduct of a nature to bring discredit upon the military service, and all crimes or offenses not capital, of which persons subject to military law may be guilty, shall be taken cognizance of by a general or special or summary court-martial according to the nature and degree of the offense, and punished at the discretion of such court. 
IV. HOW THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ARMED FORCES INTERPRETS ARTICLE 125 TODAY: UNITED STATES v. MARCUM
While Lawrence seemed to provide a far-reaching umbrella of privacy protections, the question of how those rights would be interpreted in a military setting remained unresolved until the appeal of Air Force Technical Sergeant (E-6) Eric Marcum in 2003. 80 Marcum was the supervising noncommissioned officer of a flight of intelligence linguists. 81 He developed a variety of close relationships with his male subordinates and, allegedly, had "sexual encounters" with six of them. Of importance to this comment, the court-martial found that one of Marcum's violations of Article 125 was for consensual sodomy and not the non-consensual sodomy that had been charged. 84 It was this conviction for consensual sodomy which formed one of the bases for Marcum's appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces. 85
A. The Relationship and Act at Issue
This particular conviction stemmed from Marcum's relationship with Senior Airman (E-4) Robert Harrison, one of Marcum's subordinates. 86 Following a night of drinking, Harrison returned with Marcum to Marcum's apartment,87 where, before going to bed, Harrison took off all of his clothing with the exception of his boxer shorts and· T-shirt. 88 He then went to sleep on Marcum's couch and at some point during the night he awoke to the following: "I looked down and I was trying to keep my eyes closed because I felt something strange and I didn't know exactly what was going on but I opened my eyes just enough to see Sergeant's head over my crotch and I felt his mouth on my penis. "89
Of importance to the appellate court, Harrison testified that although he said nothing at the time and simply rolled over, the encounter made him "scared, angry, and uncomfortable" and he confronted Marcum about the incident to ensure, "this sort of thing d[id]n't ever happen again."90
Highlighting the apparent consensual nature of their relationship, on cross-examination Harrison admitted that he continued to go out drinking with Marcum, would spend the night at Marcum's apartment, sent Marcum gifts from his travels, and even told Marcum that The court-martial jury, a panel of officer and enlisted members, found Marcum innocent on the forcible sodomy charge, "but guilty of non-forcible sodomy in violation of Article 125."94 Thus, in light of the Lawrence ruling, the door was opened for an appellate challenge of Marcum's conviction.
95
B. Standard of Review
From the onset of its consideration of Marcum's appeal, the Court relied on its previous holding from United States v. Scoby96 in asserting that "Article 125 forbids sodomy whether it is consensual or forcible, heterosexual or homosexual, public or private."97 The court then considered whether Article 125 remained constitutional after Lawrence. 98 Because the case presented a constitutional question, the court reviewed this case de novo. 99 Following an in-depth review of Lawrence, the Marcum court was persuaded that the Supreme Court did not rely on any particular method of traditional constitutional analysis.
lOo The court was particularly focused on the limits articulated by the Lawrence Court stating, " [ t] he Supreme Court did not expressly state whether or not this text represented an exhaustive or illustrative list of exceptions to the liberty interest identified .... "101
In deciding which standard of review to use, the court acknowledged the use of "either the rational basis test or strict scrutiny might well prove dispositive of a facial challenge to Article 125."102 However, the court was compelled by neither and opted for a case by case analysis instead of reviewing the statute on its face. Further, the court noted that the Lawrence court failed to articulate the privacy interest at issue in the case as a fundamental right. 105 Thus, the court would not take it upon itself to impute a fundamental right to members of the military where the Supreme Court had not even extended it in a civilian context. 106
C. Lawrence in the Military Environment
The Marcum court concluded that Lawrence applied in the military context, but it refused to adopt the decision's implications for the military.107 The court determined that the application of Lawrence required a different standard for servicemembers than it would for civilians.
108 Focusing on various cases where the court has upheld servicemembers' rights,109 the court stated it had routinely extended the protections of the Bill of Rights to the military, "except in cases where the express terms of the Constitution make such application inapposite."llo The court explained that '" [t]he military is, by necessity, a specialized society,"'l11 and therefore, "it is clear that servicemembers, as a general matter, do not share the same autonomy as civilians."1l2
In In its holding the court explained this prong of the Marcum Test with some unnecessary steps. For example, the court asked whether the conduct involved minors or was in public. 137 This is duplicative; if either of these were true, the analysis presumably would not proceed beyond the first part of the Marcum Test which requires the conduct to be private and between adults. 138 Additionally, the injury or coercion to which the Lawrence court refers is unclear,139 although one could, presumably, get to this step of the analysis if the accused had taken advantage of an incompetent adult. In a situation like that, while the sexual contact may have been technically "consented to" and was in private, an incompetent adult could be unknowingly, and even willingly, injured. The state, it seems, would have a legitimate interest in a case like that.
As for the second half of the second exception, coercion, the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces has previously stated that a "coercive atmosphere ... includes, for example, threats to injure others or statements that resistance would be futile"140 and that "[c]onsent [ ... ] induced by ... coercion is equivalent to physical force."141 Byapplying these definitions, the logical inference is that behavior compelled by force would not be consensual. Thus, this exception is also unnecessary as the Marcum Test's first prong, specifically the requirement that the conduct be consensual, would again be dispositive. 142 134. [d. 135. [d. 136. [d. 137. [d. 138. See The third exception in this second prong of the Marcum Test, involving the ability to easily refuse consent, is important in the military context because of the military's hierarchical nature. 143 As the court points out, "the nuance of military life is significant."144 The Air Force's regulation governing unprofessional relationships further articulates the importance of the policy maintaining professional relationships in the military context:
[T] he nature of the military mission requires absolute confidence in command and an unhesitating adherence to orders that may result in inconvenience, hardships or, at times, injury or death. This distinction makes the maintenance of professional relationships in the military more critical than in civilian organizations. 145
Indeed, this part of the test is where the Marcum court would eventually find that Marcum's conduct, involving a senior-subordinate relationship, was an exception to the reach of Lawrence's protections. 146
As to the final exception in this prong of the test, other circumstances placing the conduct outside Lawrence's protections, the Marcum court left open the range of conduct which might be encompassed. 147 The court noted the Supreme Court had failed to express whether the Lawrence exceptions it articulated were inclusive, thus the court was likewise unwilling to limit itself.148 Therefore, when analyzing conduct that does not seem to fit into any of the previous exceptions, one must ensure that the conduct might not somehow fit under this "other circumstances" exception, assuming that the conduct would not be considered a military-unique factor encompassed by the final prong of the test. 149
In sum, in the second prong of the Marcum Test there are four exceptions to Lawrence's protections which would bring one's conduct outside of constitutional protections: prostitution, likelihood of injury, inability to refuse consent and the catch-all, other circumstances. While seemingly limited to these four exceptions, their application to 
E. The Marcum Test as Applied to Technical Sergeant Marcum
The court found that Marcum's conduct fell outside the protections of Lawrence, and thus, Marcum's conviction for consensual sodomy stood. 158 In arriving at this determination the court found that the first prong of the Marcum Test, whether the conduct was between consenting adults in private, was satisfied by virtue of the court-martial finding of consensual sodomy.159 The court "assume[d] without deciding" that these two adults' conduct was consensual and in private. 160 The court took a more in depth view of the second prong of the Marcum Test, whether the conduct fell outside the scope of Lawrence by virtue of any of the exceptions enunciated in Lawrence, and concluded Harrison "was a person 'who might be coerced.' "161 In so doing, the court primarily focused on one exception in the second prong, namely whether the conduct involved persons who were in relationships where consent might not be easily refused. 162 Eventually, it was this element that would prove to be insurmountable for Marcum. 163
The conclusion here seems inevitable. Marcum was two grades senior to Harrison; he was his direct supervisor and a noncommissioned officer as well. 164 The court stated that not only was this conduct a violation of Article 125, it also fell under Article 92, in that the unprofessional relationship was a failure to obey a regulation, specifically Air Force Instruction 36-2909,165 which forbids relationships "when they detract from the authority of superiors or result in, or reasonably create the appearance of, favoritism, misuse of office or position, or the abandonment of organization.al goals for personal interests."166
Having In light of the Coast Guard's military-unique regulations and "the clear military interests of discipline and order that they reflect," the court placed Stirewalt's conduct outside of the protection of Lawrence.
182 Further, the court specifically stated that the fact only the subordinate Stirewalt was charged did not "alter the nature of the liberty interest at stake."183 For the second time in as many opportunities the court affirmed a servicemember's court-martial conviction of consensual sodomy.184 Crim. App. Mar. 30, 2005) (finding that a senior-subordinate consensual heterosexual sexual relationship, with a subordinate "victim," warranted analysis under the third prong, other military unique factors, and not the second prong, inability to easily refuse consent, as was the case with a similar (albeit homosexual) fact pattern in Marcum). Stirewalt, 60 MJ. at 304. on two fronts: it violates their right to privacyIS6 and is void for vagueness. IS7 As was previously discussed, the Marcum and Stirewalt rulings have quashed, for now, the latest attacks on the military's sodomy statute under right to privacy principles enunciated in Lawrence.
ISS Yet, in deflecting the right to privacy attack, the court may have left itself susceptible to an attack based on the void for vagueness principle 1s9 when it created the three-prong Marcum Test. 19o
A. Void for Vagueness
The Supreme Court's standard for void for vagueness doctrine has been oft cited: "The doctrine incorporates notions of fair notice or warning. Moreover, it requires legislatures to set reasonably clear guidelines for law enforcement officials and triers of fact in order to prevent 'arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement." '191 In 
187.
188. 189. 190. 19l. 192. 193. 194 . 566, 572-73 (1974». 5 MJ. 160, 161-63 (1978 . Id. at 161-62. Alaska, Ohio, and Florida had ruled that definitions similar to the one used here were unconstitutionally vague. Id. While the United States Supreme Court, in Rnse v. Locke, 423 U.S. 48, 49-50 (1975) , along with the state courts of New Jersey, Nevada, Michigan, Missouri, Indiana, Maine, Oklahoma, and New Mexico did not view "crimes against nature," or like definitions, as unconstitutionally vague. State v. Lair, 301 A.2d 748, 752 (NJ. 1973) . Scoby, 5 MJ. at 162. [Vol. 35 Clause requires is that the law give sufficient warning that men may conduct themselves so as to avoid that which is forbidden."195 With this standard, the court reviewed the history of the phrase "crimes against nature," which it felt was similar to "unnatural carnal copulation,"196 and opined, as did the Supreme Court, that anyone who wanted to know what particular acts would fit under this language could have easily determined them. 197 With this finding, the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces easily determined the phrase was defined well enough so that the average service member would understand what it means, and therefore, the phrase was not unconstitutionally vague. 198 In another case, United States v. Johnson, the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces found a charge for aggravated assault was not void for vagueness when the underlying act was consensual sodomy.199 In Johnson, however, the service member was given specific warnings that, due to his HIV positive status and the harm that could befall others if he were to engage in sodomy, he could be held criminally liable. 20o
With the court's creation of the Marcum Test, one could surmise the court changed what was once, arguably, an understandable statute into one that the servicemember of "ordinary intelligence"201 might not understand. Courts, however, attempt to avoid constitutional concerns when they create limiting tests;202 therefore, it would seem, to remain constitutional the Marcum Test would have to be interpreted in lock-step with Lawrence. Thus, one could argue that for servicemembers, just like civilians, consensual, non-economic, private sodomy between adults should not be outlawed. 203 This argument fails, however, because constitutional rights in the military setting are not interpreted in lock-step with the civilian world. 204 [d. 197. [d. Interestingly, the court did not define the specific acts which might define this phrase, stating that "some esoteric acts may not easily be identifiable as within or without the scope of Article 125," however, it did quote the United States Supreme Court citing the Missouri Supreme Court, which stated that the phrase "embraced sodomy, bestiality, buggery, fellatio, and cunnilingus within its terms." [d. at 162-63 (quoting Rose, 423 U.S. at 50). 198. [d. at 163. 199. 30 MJ. 53, 56 (C.MA 1990 ). 200. [d. 201. Scory, 5 MJ. at 163. 202. See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 211 (2003 . "If a reasonable limiting construction 'has been or could be placed on the challenged statute' to avoid constitutional concerns, we should embrace it." [d. (quoting Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613 (1973) and Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,44 (1976) 
B. Constitutional Rights as Applied to Military Members
While the Supreme Court has said, "men and women in the Armed Forces do not leave constitutional safeguards and judicial protection behind when they enter military service,"205 the Court has also noted that military life is not the same as civilian life 206 and therefore, due process rights might be less in the military sphere. 207
The Marcum court itself proclaimed that, "an understanding of military culture and mission cautions against sweeping constitutional pronouncements that may not account for the nuance of military life."208 The court also remarked, however, that the Lawrence Court had failed to limit the liberty interest it sought to protect to only civilians, thus implicitly granting the rights to military personne1. States v. Marcum, 60 MJ. 198,206 (C.A.A.F. 2004) . 209. Id. 210. Weiss v. United States, 510 U.S. 163, 177 (1994) (quoting Rostker, 453 U.S. at 70) (holding that military judges were sufficiently insulated from command influence to satisfy due process requirements). 211. See Parker, 417 U.S. at 756 (finding that differences between military and civilian life warrants applying different constitutional standards when reviewing constitutional questions arising in the military context). But see Baime, supra note 53, at 130-32 (stating it is "disingenuous to argue that private consensual sodomy is prejudicial to good order and discipline or service discrediting" to maintain that there exists a military need to intrude into servicemembers' bedrooms); Cullen, supra note 151, at 162-63 (arguing the military has no "particular need to regulate the adult, consensual, noncommercial, private sex-related decisions of its members"). See also James M. Hirschhorn, The Separate Community: Military Uniqueness and Servicemen'5 Constitutional Rights, 62 N.C. L. REv. 177 (1984) . Although over 20 years old, this article provides a still useful, in-depth discussion of constitutional rights as they apply in the military context. See id. 
VI. ALTERNATIVES AVAILABLE TO CHARGING CONSENSUAL SODOMY
If the military courts of appeals continue to follow the relationshipbased analysis 226 then actually charging sodomy as a crime would not only be unnecessary because the underlying relationship will be prosecutable,227 it may also be multiplicious.
A. Use oj Alternate Punitive Articles oj the UeM]
Relying on the relationship-based analysis, a number of alternatives are available to military prosecutors to punish military members engaged in impermissible relationships, regardless whether any sexual contact has occurred. 228 In its supplemental brief, to support the legitimacy of the sodomy statute, the government cited a number of cases that were disposed of with other than Article 125 convictions. 229 Even the Marcum court pointed out that the conduct Marcum was convicted of, Article 125, consensual sodomy, could have been charged under Article 92, for violating a regulation,23o because Marcum was in violation of the Air Force's unprofessional relationships regulation. 231
Thus, consensual sodomy cases that come under the umbrella of "unprofessional relationships" can be charged under Article 92, for failure to follow a regulation,232 Article 133, for conduct unbecoming an officer,233 or Article 134, the general article, which is also the article under which adultery is charged. 234
Additionally, consensual homosexual sodomy cases can be handled administratively under 10 U.S.C. § 654, the military's homosexual policy, with, for example, an administrative discharge. 235 The policy covers, in detail, Congress's belief that " [t] here is no constitutional right to serve in the armed forces,"236 the distinct differences between civilian and military life,237 the steps to be taken to separate servicemembers if they meet certain homosexual "qualifiers,"238 and some of the rights of those targeted by the statute. 239
The sodomy statute is thus duplicative as applied to homosexuals, if the government's purpose is to separate those who have, or would, engage in consensual homosexual conduct. 24o 10 U.S.C. § 654 clearly Failure to obey order or regulation Any person subject to this chapter who-(1) violates or fails to obey any lawful general order or regulation; (2) having knowledge of any other lawful order issued by a member of the armed forces, which it is his duty to obey, fails to obey the order; or (3) is derelict in the performance of his duties; shall be punished as a court-martial may direct. Though not specifically mentioned in this chapter, all disorders and neglects to the pn:judice of good order and discipline in the armed forces, all conduct of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces, and crimes and offenses not capital, of which persons subject to this chapter may be guilty, shall be taken cognizance of by a general, special, or summary court-martial, according to the nature and degree of the offense, and shall be punished at the discretion of that court. covers the breadth of homosexual conduct, even covering non-acts, as the statute covers those who say they are homosexual without ever having committed a homosexual act. 241 Therefore, based solely on the government's interest to separate homosexuals from military service, the sodomy statute adds only a criminal conviction 242 which, when taken in conjunction with the administrative discharge that 10 U.S.C. § 654 requires, does nothing more than provide a newly separated homosexual servicemember with a federal conviction with which to restart his or her life. 243 Charging Article 125, consensual sodomy, in almost every instance, becomes duplicative at the least, and multiplicious at most. Further, it leaves a case vulnerable to a constitutionally grounded appellate review if a conviction is awarded based on a consensual sodomy charge. 244
B. Multiplicity
The protection from multiplicity is based upon the Fifth Amendment principle "against double jeopardy [which] provides that an accused cannot be convicted of both an offense and a lesser-included offense."245 To raise a claim of multiplicity, an accused must raise the issue at trial or the issue will only be reviewed by an appellate court for plain error. 246 The idea that two charges are "factually the same" is a basic premise of a multiplicity claim. [An] [a]ppellant may show plain error and overcome [waiver] by showing that the specifications are facially duplica-tive, that is, factually the same. The test to determine whether an offense is factually the same as another offense, and therefore lesser-included to that offense, is the "elements" test. Under this test, the court considers whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not. Rather than adopting a literal application of the elements test, this Court [has] stated that resolution of lesserincluded claims can only be resolved by lining up elements realistically and determining whether each element of the supposed lesser offense is rationally derivative of one or more elements of the other offense-and vice versa. Whether an offense is a lesser-included offense is a matter of law that this Court will consider de novo. 248
267
Post-Marcum, this test was employed by the Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals to determine whether adultery, consensual sodomy, and fraternization convictions were multiplicious. 249 Ultimately, in that case the court determined that the fraternization and consensual sodomy charges were not multiplicious, while the adultery and fraternization were. 250 Interestingly, the court was persuaded by the factual distinction of "sexual intercourse" versus "fellatio" when it determined that the fraternization and sodomy charges were "factually distinguishable. "251
This ruling creates an interesting legal twiSt. 252 If, on the one hand, a servicemember is involved in an unauthorized relationship and engages in sexual intercourse and sodomy, the servicemember can be charged with both fraternization and sodomy, without the charges being multiplicious. 253 If, however, on the other hand, this same servicemember only goes so far as to engage in sodomy within the unauthorized relationship, the fraternization and sodomy charges would be multiplicious because they would both be based upon sodomy, and thus "factually the same."254 [Vol. 35 In cases like Gamez, however, where the fraternization and sodomy are based on different sex acts, one could argue that the subtle distinction between varying sex acts is meaningless because of Marcum's new requirements. 255 The Marcum holding, in essence, states the crucial fact now required to uphold consensual sodomy charges is the unauthorized relationship in conjunction with the sodomy.256 Thus, to be constitutional in the military environment, a consensual sodomy charge now requires an unauthorized relationship-based nexus, such as adultery or fraternization, making the relationship itself a key fact of the sodomy charge. 257 Therefore the consensual sodomy offense and the relationship-based offense, regardless of any differences in the underlying sex acts, would be necessarily "factually the same,"258 and thus, charging both would be multiplicious.
VII. CONCLUSION
The newly created Marcum Test is constitutional and, for most servicemembers, expands their right to engage in private sexual conduct. 259 The Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces' rulings in Marcum and Stirewalt imply that the nature of the relationship between two people will form the basis for determining whether their conduct falls under the Lawrence protections. 26o Appellate courts will uphold consensual sodomy convictions when the underlying relationship is unauthorized, while the converse will be true as well. 261 The implication this may have on homosexual conduct has yet to be seen. 262 If the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces continues to follow this relationship-based path, then it would seem consensual homosexual sodomy would be proscribed and within the government's right to prosecute. 263 Military prosecutors, however, have at their disposal a number of other punitive and administrative articles of the UCMJ with which to
